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As an issue with a great deal of relevance to ongoing historical and social events, 
prejudice has captured the attention of empirical social psychologists almost since the inception 
of social psychology.  However, the relevance of prejudice to current events has meant that, as 
the treatment of minorities in American society has changed over time, so too has researchers’ 
conceptualization of prejudice.  The result of these changes in conceptualization is that some 
ideas that were developed within a particular historical context have since been abandoned to the 
dustbin of outmoded psychological theory as changing historical circumstances have made those 
ideas (apparently) irrelevant to the new societal context (Meehl, 1978). 
The tendency to perhaps prematurely abandon once promising research ideas is only 
exacerbated by the fact that, as a construct, “prejudice” is difficult to conceptualize and 
accurately define (Devine, 1995).  The phenomena that are supposedly linked to prejudice span 
the affective, cognitive, biological, and behavioral domains, and these phenomena can exist at 
intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup levels.  The result of these disparate 
aspects of prejudice is that, over time, researchers’ definitions of prejudice have emphasized 
different aspects of these phenomena and levels of analysis (Devine, 1995).   
An additional complication is that most people view prejudice as a topic that is highly 
relevant to their moral values (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Allport, 1954).  This 
relevance to morals makes the definition of prejudice particularly subject to personal 
interpretation, and also means that intentions, which have been the object of their own vigorous 
scientific debates (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Ryan & Deci, 2006), play a central role in 
many definitions of prejudice.  Overall, the difficulties in defining prejudice and the relevance of 
definitions of prejudice to moral values has made researchers’ conceptualizations of prejudice 
particularly sensitive to historical events (Duckitt, 1992). 
 
 
The interaction between historical events and researchers’ changing conceptualizations of 
prejudice is exemplified by researchers’ assumptions about the intentionality of prejudice.  
Whereas early in the empirical study of prejudice, most researchers assumed that prejudice was 
driven mostly by intentional processes (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), 
most modern researchers focus on the unintentional aspects of prejudice (e.g., Devine, 1989; 
Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). 
In this chapter, we will draw on previous treatments of the history of prejudice research 
(Devine, 1995; Duckitt, 1992; Milner, 1983) to conduct an historical review of how events in 
both the real world and the research world have shaped researchers’ conceptualizations of the 
intentionality of prejudice.  We argue that, while early research focused on the intentional 
aspects of prejudice, modern research focuses more exclusively on the unintentional aspects of 
prejudice.  As a result of the modern overattention to the unintentional aspects of prejudice, 
researchers have ignored the possibility that some people are motivated to express prejudice 
(Forscher & Devine, in preparation).  Through our argument, we hope to build a bridge between 
modern and classic insights into prejudice processes. 
Early conceptions of prejudice: Prejudice follows from negative intentions 
Prior to the 1920s, social scientists accepted the premise of White racial superiority, and 
theories of race were used as tools to support and justify White supremacy (Haller, 1971).  
However, the rise of the early Civil Rights movement in the 1920s caused some social scientists 
to question whether race-based stereotypes and antipathy were justified, leading to the first 
empirical efforts to define, identify, and measure racial prejudice (e.g., Bogardus, 1925; 
Guilford, 1931).  The earliest of these studies typically involved surveying respondents about 
 
 
their feelings towards one or more social groups and describing how these feelings varied across 
occupations, races, and other social categories. 
Over time, however, prejudice researchers began to shift from simple description of 
prejudice to explanation of its origins.  In these explanations, prejudice researchers used 
correlational methods, case studies, and towards the end of the 1940s, experiments to attempt to 
explain race-based antipathy in terms of Freudian defense mechanisms, which were presumed to 
be universal features of human psychology (e.g., MacCrone, 1937; Veltfort & Lee, 1943, 
Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939).  Although many researchers following the 
psychodynamic approach to prejudice used the correlational methods of the previous decades, 
other researchers added case studies and experiments to the methodological toolbox used to 
understand prejudice.  Overall, researchers following the psychodynamic approach portrayed 
prejudice as a normal byproduct of ordinary psychological processes.  Moreover, intentions did 
not figure prominently in this conceptualization. 
Prejudice research underwent a dramatic transformation in theory if not in method 
following revelations of the horrific events of the Holocaust during World War II.  The anti-
Semitism that drove the Holocaust seemed to stem from explicitly articulated intentions to 
oppress and murder Jews.  Thus, conceptualizations of prejudice that did not incorporate 
intentions seemed inadequate to explain the events of the scale and magnitude of the Holocaust.  
Moreover, if the dominant theoretical analyses of the previous decades were correct and 
prejudice stemmed from ordinary psychological processes, the unsettling implication was that 
the psychological seeds that bore the bitter fruits of the Holocaust were present in everyone (see 
Milgram, 1963).  As a means of distancing prejudice from ordinary people, researchers began to 
emphasize the intentional, pathological, and / or abnormal aspects of prejudice. 
 
 
Because this new theoretical approach portrayed prejudice as abnormal or pathological, 
the intrapsychic processes that were assumed to cause prejudice were similarly characterized as 
abnormal or pathological. These processes ranged from personality characteristics (e.g., Adorno, 
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) to belief structures (e.g., Rokeach, 1973), all of 
which were assumed to be closely embedded with one’s sense of self.  Because researchers 
assumed that change in prejudice required change in the intrapsychic processes that gave rise to 
prejudice (Rokeach, 1973), change in prejudice, when it did happen, was assumed to be a 
difficult and sometimes arduous process requiring substantial personal change.  Although a few 
prejudice researchers attempted to tackle the challenge of changing the underlying psychological 
variables presumed to promote prejudice (Rokeach, 1973), more often prejudice researchers 
developed tools to identify the people who might be prone to prejudice so that broader society 
could take steps to ameliorate the potentially dangerous influence of these people. 
Although the intensely person-focused approach of post-World War II research did not 
survive the early years of prejudice research, the more general effects of World War II and the 
Holocaust on prejudice research lingered beyond the immediate postwar era.  Specifically, for 
decades after World War II, prejudice researchers assumed that prejudice arose because of 
negative intentions towards a specific out-group.  Researchers did shift over time in terms of 
where they located the ultimate cause of these negative intentions, first preferring individual 
causes such as pathological patterns of personality (Adorno et al., 1950) and illogical belief 
structures (Rokeach, 1973), and later preferring social causes such as early childhood 
socialization experiences (Westie, 1964) and conformity (Pettigrew, 1958).  However, a unifying 
theme of these disparate causal explanations is that they identified prejudice with intentional 
actions and processes. 
 
 
The assumption that prejudice is driven by negative intentions lingered even as the 
changes wrought by the Civil Rights Movement made the expression of overtly negative 
sentiments toward out-groups socially unacceptable.  As national surveys revealed steady 
improvements in people’s reported racial attitudes (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997), 
researchers were reluctant to conclude that these changes in reported attitudes extended to 
genuine changes in “prejudice”.  Indeed, as outcomes for outgroups failed to improve alongside 
people’s reported attitudes, prejudice researchers speculated that prejudice had gone 
underground and taken on a new, “modern” form (McConahay, 1983).  Under this explanation, 
although the “old-fashioned” forms of prejudice were no longer expressed in public, prejudice 
was still revealed through covert patterns of behavior that could not be easily attributed by 
observers to negative intentions toward the outgroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kinder & 
Sears, 1981). 
The general suspicion that survey evidence did not reflect the reality of people’s hidden, 
underlying levels of “modern” prejudice, together with a theoretical analysis that argued that 
people were motivated to hide their “true” levels of prejudice from others, inspired researchers to 
devise new methods of assessing prejudice that did not rely on surveys or self-reports.  These 
new methods relied on behaviors, such helping, that were clearly valenced, but for which no one 
particular level of the behavior could be clearly attributed to “prejudice”.  By experimentally 
manipulating whether the target of the chosen behavior was a White person or a Black person 
and comparing the positivity or negativity of the behavior towards the two different targets, 
researchers could assess whether, on average, Black people were subject to subtle forms of 
discrimination.  To the extent that Black people were indeed treated more negatively or less 
positively than White people, the difference was attributed to prejudice, with the concomitant 
 
 
implication that the participants in the study possessed negative intentions towards out-groups 
(Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980). 
As evidence accumulated that, in situations where a response could not obviously be 
attributed to prejudice, people behaved more negatively and less positively towards Blacks than 
towards Whites, researchers became increasingly disenchanted with self-report measures and 
increasingly cynical that prejudice could be changed (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980).  In 
effect, researchers had shifted their conceptualization of prejudice such that any behavioral 
response that resulted in a relatively unfavorable outcome for a minority group member was 
considered evidence for prejudiced beliefs and / or intentions, and any overt protestations to the 
contrary were considered mere self-presentation.  As Crosby and her colleagues (pg. 557) put it, 
many researchers concluded that “. . . whites today are, in fact, more prejudiced than they are 
wont to admit.”  This shift in conceptualization was a dramatic change from the earlier era, in 
which self-reports were taken as face-value indicators of beliefs.   Although consistent with the 
available evidence, the shift in conceptualization had the unfortunate side-effect of leaving the 
route to reducing and eliminating the disparity between reported attitudes and behavior unclear. 
Although Crosby and her colleagues’ (1980) conclusion was consistent with the then-
dominant conceptualization of prejudice, the contradiction between self-reports and 
discriminatory behavior had an alternative explanation.  Specifically, perhaps the improvements 
in reported attitudes did, in fact, reflect genuine changes in intentions, but some biasing process 
or set of processes prevented people from fully translating these intentions to behave fairly into 
unbiased behavior.  Moreover, to the extent that the biasing processes operate without people 
being aware of them, people may not even be aware of any inconsistency between their verbal 
reports and behavior.  
 
 
If one accepts that discriminatory behavior can arise from unintentional processes despite 
intentions that are inconsistent with prejudice, one must consider the conclusion that a substantial 
percentage of discrimination is caused by unintentional processes.  One corollary of this 
conclusion is that subtle differences in behavior towards Whites and minorities can no longer be 
taken as prima facie evidence of negative intentions toward out-groups.  A second corollary is 
that, one might be able to harness people’s good intentions to disrupt the influence of the 
unintentional biases, thereby reducing or even eliminating subtle discriminatory behavior 
(Devine, 1989). 
Overall, the interpretation of the disparity between self-reports and subtle behavior as 
stemming from unintentional processes requires a major shift in researchers’ conceptualization 
of prejudice.  Instead of conceiving of prejudice as antipathy stemming from negative intentions, 
prejudice is linked more to the processes that prevent the translation of intentions into behavior 
or lead to discriminatory behavior in opposition to egalitarian intentions.  This 
reconceptualization flew in the face of long-standing assumptions that characterized prejudice 
and discrimination as intentional.  In fact, the alternative interpretation of the discrepancy 
between self-reports and behavior would not be taken seriously until the development of new 
theory and methods in the 1990s. 
Modern conceptions of prejudice: Prejudice follows from unintentional associations 
 A turning point in the empirical study of prejudice came with the introduction of the 
prejudice habit model (Devine, 1989).  The prejudice habit model distinguishes between 
controlled and automatic processes and argues that, whereas controlled processes reflect people’s 
beliefs, automatic processes reflect the associations acquired from broader culture.  While 
people’s beliefs are argued to stem from values and intentions, both of which are central to a 
 
 
person’s self-concept, automatic associations are argued to stem from frequently activated 
pairings of groups with stereotypic characteristics.  Thus, to the extent that a person believes that 
the use of stereotypes about a particular group is wrong, that person’s automatic associations 
about the group may nonetheless conflict with those beliefs.  Moreover, because stereotypic 
pairings occur so frequently in the social environment, merely encountering a member of the 
group is sufficient to trigger stereotypic associates that are paired with that out-group.  The 
implication of this analysis is that even people who believe that discrimination is wrong may 
nonetheless behave in ways that have negative consequences for outgroups, provided that 
situational constraints prevent controlled processes from inhibiting the influence of automatic 
stereotypes. 
The prejudice habit model thus provided the theoretical framework needed to reinterpret 
the disparity between self-reports and behavior as stemming from unintentional processes.  
Rather than assuming that all self-reports reflect strategic self-presentation, the prejudice habit 
model argues that self-reports very often reflect genuine intentions to respond without prejudice.  
Rather than assuming that subtly discriminatory behavior reflects a “modern” form of prejudice 
that is only revealed when observers are unable to clearly attribute one’s behavior to negative 
intentions, the prejudice habit model argues that subtle discrimination stems from situational 
factors that prevent controlled processes from overriding automatic processes.  The more radical 
effect of the new theoretical framework, however, was the new way in which the framework 
caused modern prejudice researchers to reconceptualize prejudice.  Specifically, instead of 
identifying “prejudice” as intentional, many modern prejudice research has come to identify 
prejudice as equivalent to automatic stereotypic associations (e.g., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; 
Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Banaji & Greenwald, 1995).  Because stereotypic 
 
 
associations operate independently from and despite countervailing intentions, many researchers’ 
conceptualizations of prejudice are largely divorced from intentions. 
The new dissociation between intentions and prejudice has had a dramatic effect on the 
collective research agenda.  If one accepts the premise that “prejudice” can occur despite 
countervailing intentions, the most logical research agenda is one that allows the identification of 
the factors that increase or decrease susceptibility to unintentional bias.  In line with this logic, 
identifying factors that affect susceptibility to unintentional bias has dominated the modern 
research agenda.  This task has required new methodological tools that allow the direct 
measurement the unintentional biases.  Obtaining such direct measures would avoid the 
ambiguity inherent in the subtle bias experiments of the 1970s and 1980s, in which the processes 
causing disparities between self-reports and pro-White behavior were unclear.  The development 
of such direct measures has been the major methodological revolution of the modern era.  
Modern prejudice researchers now have a broad array of cognitive (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998; Fazio et al., 1995; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), mathematical 
(Payne, 2001; Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005), and neuroscientific 
(Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Amodio et al., 2004; Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & 
Devine, 2003) tools at their disposal that allow them to precisely document the interplay between 
controlled and automatic processes in the production of unintentional bias. 
Using these new theoretical analyses and methodological tools, modern prejudice 
researchers have discovered that unintentional bias only occurs in specific situations where self-
control resources are limited and / or where there is no clear “non-prejudiced” response (Devine, 
1989).  Modern prejudice researchers have also developed a large number of strategies that 
reduce automatic stereotypic associations, at least for short periods of time (e.g., Todd, 
 
 
Bodenhausen, Richeson, & Galinsky, 2011; Kawakami et al., 2000; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 
2001).  If these strategies are presented to people in the context of a larger program designed to 
elicit motivation to respond without prejudice and awareness of unintentional bias and its 
consequences, people who exert effort practicing the strategies create long-term reductions in 
their susceptibility to unintentional bias (Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012).  To the extent 
that unintentional bias contributes to society-wide disparities, the modern focus on unintentional 
bias may have provided insights that are useful for broader issues beyond the thorny theoretical 
problems of past researchers. 
Despite spurring many productive lines of research, we argue that the intense focus on 
unintentional bias has had some inadvertent negative consequences for prejudice research.  First, 
the focus on unintentional bias may have made prejudice researchers less thoughtful about the 
ways in which they use self-report measures.  Second, this focus has limited the range of 
phenomena that prejudice researchers attempt to explain.  Finally, the focus on unintentional bias 
has placed artificial limitations on the range of interventions prejudice researchers develop to 
address problems related to prejudice.   
The first inadvertent consequence, that of making prejudice researchers less thoughtful 
about their use of self-report measures, is illustrated in the limited range of purposes to which 
modern prejudice researchers put self-report measures.  More specifically, modern prejudice 
researchers generally use self-report measures in one of two ways.  First, prejudice researchers 
use self-report measures as indicators of positive intentions (e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998; Dunton 
& Fazio, 1997) or the “controlled processes” that, according to the prejudice habit model, often 
conflict with automatic stereotypic associations (e.g., Devine, 1989, McConnell & Leibold, 
2001).  Research that uses self-report measures as indicators of controlled processes tends to 
 
 
focus on the circumstances in which controlled processes are subverted by unintentional bias 
(e.g., Devine, 1989; Payne, 2001; Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008).  Thus, a substantial 
proportion of research that uses self-report measures as indicators of controlled processes focuses 
on highlighting the situations in which self-report measures do not predict behavior. 
The second way in which modern prejudice researchers use self-report measures is as the 
controlled counterpart to measures of automatic stereotypic associations (e.g., Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; 
Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009).  Research that uses self-report measures in 
this way tends to focus on theoretically and empirically validating measures of automatic 
associations by showing that they relate to behavior in circumstances that self-report measures 
do not.  Thus, research that uses self-report measures as the controlled counterpart to implicit 
measures is often focused on documenting the ways in which self-report measures predict 
behavior less well than implicit measures.  In sum, modern prejudice research, with its somewhat 
narrow focus on unintentional bias, uses self-report measures as mere points of comparison for 
implicit measures, with the result that researchers are less thoughtful about the ways in which 
self-report measures could be informative for their research. 
The second inadvertent consequence of the field’s current focus on unintentional bias is a 
narrowing of the range of phenomena that prejudice researchers attempt to explain.  The 
theoretical analysis at the foundation of modern prejudice research focuses on explaining the 
paradox that some people’s subtly discriminatory behavior contradicts self-reports that prohibit 
prejudice.  However, explaining the reasons for this contradiction requires focusing on precisely 
the behaviors that were labeled “modern prejudice” by the researchers who originally discovered 
the paradox.  Thus, when modern prejudice researchers attempt to explain the psychology of a 
 
 
particular behavior that they believe might be driven by unintentional/automatic biases, they 
typically choose behaviors such as seating distance (Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007), 
eye contact (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002), and speech disfluencies (McConnell & 
Leibold, 2001) as their outcome variables.  Although these behaviors might have important 
consequences in everyday interactions, they represent only a small subset of the universe of 
intergroup behaviors relevant to prejudice.  Perhaps most importantly, focusing on the 
psychological determinants of subtle, mostly unintentional behavior ignores the psychology of 
more extreme, mostly intentional behavior, such as hate speech or hate crimes.  The fact that 
prejudice researchers have ignored more extreme, intentional behavior is perhaps understandable 
given that such behavior is relatively difficult to study in the lab, but our ignorance of more 
extreme, intentional behavior is strange given the lasting legacies of slavery and the Holocaust 
on prejudice research. 
The last inadvertent consequence of the field’s current focus on unintentional bias, the 
placement of artificial limitations on the interventions that prejudice researchers develop, is 
closely tied to the fact that modern prejudice researchers have focused rather narrowly on 
explaining and understanding unintentional bias.  To the extent that prejudice researchers define 
prejudice as unintentional bias, prejudice researchers developing remedies to social problems 
involving prejudice will focus their efforts on reducing unintentional bias.  Indeed, in the past 
twenty years, national institutions and scholars alike have identified unintentional bias as perhaps 
the primary factor promoting the maintenance of societal gender, racial, and ethnic disparities 
(e.g., Smedley, Stith, & Nelson, 2003; Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012; Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2004; Fiske, 1998).  However, there is scant direct evidence supporting the 
privileged position of unintentional bias in promoting societal disparities (but see van den Bergh, 
 
 
Denessen, Hornstra, Voeten, & Holland, 2010).  Although unintentional bias may contribute to 
ongoing disparities, ignoring the role of other causal factors will lead to interventions that are 
less effective than those that take a multi-pronged approach (Forscher & Devine, in press).  
We have argued that modern prejudice research is perhaps too focused on understanding 
the problem of unintentional bias and have argued that this focus has unintended methodological, 
conceptual, and practical consequences for our overall understanding of intergroup phenomena.  
In the final section of this chapter, we will describe a methodological tool, a scale measuring the 
motivation to express prejudice, which we developed to help address some of the shortcomings 
of the focus on unintentional bias.  We will also describe how the development of this 
methodological tool was informed by puzzling empirical patterns in research on the motivation 
to respond without prejudice. 
Integrating past and modern insights: The case study of the motivation to express prejudice 
 The development of the motivation to express prejudice scale grew out of puzzling 
patterns extant in research on one of the central concerns of modern prejudice research, the 
reasons people are motivated to respond without prejudice.  Plant and Devine (1998) have 
argued that these reasons can be classified into internal (personal, value-driven) and external 
(social, norm-driven) categories.  Motivation that stems from internal sources arises out of 
personal values that are inconsistent with the expression of prejudice.  Internal motivation tends 
to lead people to adopt strict, well-internalized, personally-endorsed standards that prohibit even 
subtle expressions of prejudice (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, Devine, 
& Zuwerink, 1993).  Violations of these standards are perceived by internally motivated people 
as moral failures (Devine et al., 1991), leading to guilt and later efforts to prevent future 
deviations from the standards (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Monteith, 1993; 
 
 
Monteith et al., 2002).  In sum, the overall goal of primarily internally motivated people is to 
reduce and eliminate their prejudice, regardless of whether that prejudice can be detected by 
others (Plant & Devine, 2009). 
In contrast, motivation that stems from external sources is driven by a concern over 
violating the pervasive anti-prejudiced norms by appearing prejudiced to others.  Instead of 
leading to the adoption of personally-endorsed standards prohibiting prejudice, external 
motivation tends to lead people to adopt what they perceive to be the standards of others in the 
regulation of their behavior (Plant & Devine, 1998; Plant & Devine, 2001; Plant & Devine, 
2009).  Violations of these social standards lead people who are primarily externally motivated 
to feel threatened and to attempt to hide the violation from others (Plant & Devine, 2001).   In 
sum, in contrast to the goal adopted by people who are primarily internally motivated, primarily 
externally motivated people have the goal of hiding their expressions of prejudice from others 
(Plant & Devine, 2009). 
An interesting aspect of the internal and external motivations to respond without 
prejudice is that these two motivations are essentially uncorrelated; people can be high in one 
type of motivation, both, or neither.  Much of the research on the motivations to respond without 
prejudice has involved uncovering the regulatory patterns of the four motivational subgroups 
arising from the combinations of these two factors. 
Three of the four subgroups are relatively well-understood.  Consistent with self-
determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000), internal motivation to respond without prejudice is 
primary in that, regardless of whether a person is high or low in external motivation, the primary 
goal of a person who is high in internal motivation is to reduce and eliminate their prejudice 
(Devine et al., 2002; Plant & Devine, 2009).  Moreover, people low in both internal and external 
 
 
motivation to respond without prejudice are unmotivated in that they do not exert effort to 
regulate their intergroup behavior.  However, people who are low in internal motivation but high 
in external motivation have long posed a theoretical and empirical puzzle for researchers 
interested in the motivation to respond without prejudice.  Specifically, this subgroup of people 
reacts to social pressure to act without prejudice towards the target out-group in ways that 
suggest more than just a lack of intentions to respond without prejudice towards that out-group 
(e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998; Plant & Devine, 2001; Plant & Devine, 2009; Cox & Devine, 2014). 
Consider an illustrative study by Plant and Devine (2009), which was designed to 
illuminate the specific intentions that underlie peoples’ efforts to respond without prejudice.  
Plant and Devine led their participants to believe that they were going to have an interracial 
interaction.  Prior to the interracial interaction, the participants were given the opportunity to 
complete what was described as a prejudice reduction program that would have one of a variety 
of different consequences for the participant’s future behavior.  As a behavioral indicator of 
interest in the program (and therefore an indicator of the desire to obtain the described 
consequences of that program), Plant and Devine measured the amount of time the participants 
chose to spend on the prejudice reduction program. 
When the prejudice reduction program was described as reducing forms of prejudice that 
would be detectable in the upcoming interaction, people high in external motivation but low in 
internal motivation spent a relatively long time in the prejudice reduction program.  This pattern 
of behavior is consistent with the idea that this subgroup of people is concerned about appearing 
prejudiced toward others.  However, when the prejudice reduction program was described as 
reducing both prejudice that was detectable by the interaction partner and prejudice that was 
undetectable by the interaction partner, people high in internal motivation but low in external 
 
 
motivation refused to spend much time in the prejudice reduction program, despite the fact that 
this refusal would presumably come at the cost of appearing relatively prejudiced in the 
upcoming interaction.  Apparently, reducing undetectable forms of prejudice is inconsistent with 
the identity of people who are high in external motivation but low in internal motivation, to the 
point where people in this subgroup are willing to pay a cost to avoid reducing their undetectable 
prejudice.  This interpretation is further supported by the fact that, when the prejudice reduction 
program was described as reducing detectable prejudice and increasing undetectable prejudice, 
people high in external motivation and low in internal motivation spent a relatively long time in 
the program.  Overall, these patterns of data are difficult to explain with psychological constructs 
that do not directly implicate intentions to express prejudice, such as unintentionally activated 
associations, the motivations to respond without prejudice, and racial attitudes.  Instead, these 
patterns of data suggest that some people possess intentions toward out-groups that motivate 
prejudicial behavior. 
If one reflects on the historical events that originally inspired the empirical study of 
prejudice, it should not be surprising that some people possess intentions to express prejudice 
towards outgroups.  Indeed, it is hard to imagine a psychological explanation for the extreme 
anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany that does not draw on the idea of prejudicial intentions towards 
Jews.  Modern prejudice researchers seem to have lost sight of the events that motivated the 
original development of their field, perhaps because of the modern paradox of unintentional bias 
and the theories and methods that were developed to explain this paradox.  However, to 
understand the full range of intergroup phenomena, we argue that we need to reclaim the insights 
of classic prejudice research.  Reclaiming these insights will enable us to develop theory and 
methodology required to understand motivated prejudice. 
 
 
As a first step in this direction, we developed a direct measure of the motivation to 
express prejudice (Forscher et al., under review).  We reasoned that, similar to the motivation to 
respond without prejudice, people might be motivated to express prejudice for either internal or 
external reasons, so we created internal and external subscales of our motivation to express 
prejudice scale.  Some example items of the resultant scale include “My beliefs motivate me to 
express negative views about Black people” (internal) and “I minimize my contact with Black 
people in order to avoid disapproval from others” (external). We then validated our measure by 
testing its psychometric properties and its convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity. 
In our typical college samples, most people scored low in the motivation to express 
prejudice.  Moreover, people who scored high in one of the motivational subscales also tended to 
score high in the other.  We obtained evidence that the strong relationship between the internal 
and external subscales is linked to the local normative climate; when the local norms oppose a 
person’s motivation to express prejudice, the internal and external motivations to express 
prejudice become strongly linked, perhaps the general difficulty of maintaining an internal 
motivation without the support of important others.  Regardless of the specific reasons for the 
strong correlation between the internal and external subscales, for the results described in the 
following paragraphs, we averaged together the internal and external subscales of the motivation 
to express prejudice scale. 
Overall, our results strongly supported the hypothesis that the motivation to express 
prejudice is a construct that is independent from the motivation to respond without prejudice.  
The motivation to express prejudice scale had good reliability, as assessed through an internal 
consistency measure and through test-retest correlations.  The motivation to express prejudice 
was also positively related to measures of related constructs, such as Right-Wing 
 
 
Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996) and Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and negatively related to measures of constructs inconsistent with 
the motivation to express prejudice, such as the internal motivation to respond without prejudice 
and measures of positive attitudes towards the target group.  The scale was also unrelated to 
measures of constructs that it should not be related to, such as self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974), 
social desirability (Crowne & Marlow, 1960), and the external motivation to respond without 
prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998).  Moreover, when we allowed the interaction between the 
internal and external motivations to respond without prejudice to predict the motivation to 
express prejudice, people high in the external motivation to respond without prejudice and low in 
the internal motivation to respond without prejudice were highest in the motivation to express 
prejudice.  This result may help shed light on why this subgroup of people exhibit patterns of 
behavior in past literature suggesting more than a lack of a motivation to respond without 
prejudice – perhaps this subgroup of people resents the pressure they feel from society to 
respond without prejudice towards a particular group (Plant & Devine, 2001), to the point that 
expressing covert prejudice towards that target group has become an important part of their 
identity. 
We tested the predictive validity of the motivation to express prejudice scale in two ways: 
first, by testing whether the Black version of the scale predicted resistance to efforts to promote 
racial diversity, and second, by testing whether the gay version of the scale predicted voting for 
political candidates who oppose same-sex marriage on the basis of anti-gay rhetoric.  In the first 
study, we led our participants to believe that we were gathering arguments about a student 
organization, BadgerConnect, that had the goal of increasing interactions and friendships 
between Black and White students.  The participants were further informed that they would be 
 
 
asked to write an essay about BadgerConnect, which would be posted on a public website where 
other students could read and discuss it.  Following past induced compliance research (e.g., Elliot 
& Devine, 1994), we then subtly induced the participants to write an essay either for or against 
BadgerConect.  We measured whether the participants refused to write the essay of their 
assigned stance, as well as their evaluations of antoher essay, their own essay, and the stance of 
the comments they wrote on their own essay.  Consistent with our arguments that the motivation 
to express prejudice is linked to an identity consistent with expressions of prejudice, people high 
in the motivation to express prejudice were likely to refuse to write a pro-BadgerConnect essay.  
If they did agree to write an anti-BadgerConnect essay, people high in the motivation to express 
prejudice undermined the strength of this support by evaluating others’ anti-BadgerConnect 
essays favorably, evaluating their own pro-BadgerConnect unfavorably, and writing anti-
BadgerConect comments on their own pro-BadgerConnect essays.  These effects held when 
controlling for attitudes and the motivations to respond without prejudice, suggesting that our 
new measure is not identical with these alternative constructs. 
In our second study, we told the participants that we were comparing voting behavior in 
the lab with voting behavior from a real local election for the state House of Representatives.  
The participants then read about three candidates for the election who varied in their stances and 
rhetoric about a potential ban on same-sex marriage.  One of the candidates supported the ban 
with anti-gay rhetoric, a second supported the ban with rhetoric based on “family values,”, and a 
third opposed the ban with equality rhetoric.  We measured the participants’ perceptions of the 
three candidates, their choice of votes for one of the candidates, and their choice of which 
candidate to publicly support in a debate with another pro-gay participant.  People high in the 
motivation to express prejudice perceived the candidate who supported the ban with anti-gay 
 
 
rhetoric relatively positively and were relatively likely to vote for and publicly support this 
candidate, even controlling for attitudes and the motivations to respond without prejudice. 
Our work on the motivations to express prejudice provides a valuable case study in how 
attending to the intentional aspects of prejudice can help resolve theoretical and empirical 
puzzles extant in modern prejudice research.  Our new understanding of why people high in 
external motivation but low in internal motivation are particularly negative in their responding 
toward outgroups would not have been possible by solely focusing on unintentional bias, since 
the processes implicated in producing unintentional bias circumvent intentions.  Moreover, our 
insights would not have been possible by solely focusing on attitudes, since attitudes are not 
necessarily directly related to the machinery involved in the production of intentions, such as 
motivation, standards, and values.  By providing direct evidence that some forms of prejudice are 
motivated, we hope that we can help broaden researchers’ conceptions of prejudice and thereby 
reconnect modern research with the insights of classic prejudice research. 
Summary and conclusion: Prejudice involves both intentional and unintentional processes 
 In this chapter, we have described how researcher conceptualizations of prejudice have 
been shaped by a combination of events in the research world and the real world.  Specifically, 
we have argued that World War II caused prejudice researchers to focus on the intentional 
aspects of prejudice, and that this focus on intentional prejudice persisted through the Civil 
Rights Movement.  However, newly developed theory and methodology in the 1990s caused 
researchers to focus on the unintentional aspects of prejudice at the expense of our understanding 
of its intentional aspects, with the inadvertent consequence that modern prejudice researchers are 
ill-equipped to understand phenomena that are most likely intentional, such as hate-crimes. 
Finally, we argued that, if we wish to gain a complete understanding of intergroup phenomena, 
 
 
we must fuse the insights of classic and modern research so that we understand the full range of 
interactions between intentions, norms, and cognitive and motivational processes in intergroup 
situations. 
 More broadly, modern prejudice researchers must recognize that prejudice is more than 
just unintentional bias.  Prejudice research has a healthy tradition of studying the intentional 
aspects of prejudice that has been all but lost in the theoretical and methodological developments 
of the 1990s.  Focusing on the intentional aspects of prejudice will reconnect modern prejudice 
researchers with the insights of early prejudice researchers.  Reconnecting with past insights will 
broaden the range of phenomena that prejudice researchers are equipped to explain and the range 
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